In the neoliberal era, competing to host global sporting events has become a prominent urban promotion strategy, and with a few exceptions, the scholarly focus has been on the western experience. In contrast, this paper focuses on the south experience with specific reference to the 2010 Commonwealth Games in Delhi, the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa and the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil. A common argument is that such sporting events provide global marketing opportunities that can attract foreign investment, which may serve as catalysts for development. A key goal is to promote the status and power of the post-colonial nation-state (although ironically ceding sovereignty to entities like FIFA for the duration of events). While there are some benefits, especially in terms of infrastructure development, the Indian, Brazilian and South African experience suggests that the privileged tend to benefit at the expense of the poor, and socio-economic inequalities were exacerbated. These points are illustrated in this paper with reference to evictions, loss of livelihoods and violations of human rights. Disturbingly, the cost of constructing new sports' facilities and associated infrastructure escalated phenomenally from the original bid-document estimates, without any public oversight, and some are destined to be white elephants. The mega-events were largely organised and funded by the governments in consultation with the private sector, with little or no accountability to citizens, although such decisions had major implications in terms of the diversion of public spending priorities from more urgent social needs such as housing, healthcare and education.
Introduction
Marketing a city as a mega-event destination has become a prominent neoliberal urban promotion strategy. Moreover, mega-events are viewed as opportunities to fast track economic development and create positive international images to attract foreign investments and tourists (Hall, 2006) . In the neoliberal era, the 'sport-for-good narrative' has been replaced with the 'sportfor-development narrative' to justify the use of public resources to host mega-events (Coakley and Souza, 2013: 584) . Following trends in the global North, sporting megaevents are increasingly viewed as part of strategic agendas to increase global prestige and promote economic growth in cities in the global South. With a few exceptions (e.g. Matheson and Baade, 2004; Bass and Pillay, 2008; Gaffney, 2010) , the scholarly focus has been on the western experience. In contrast, this paper presents a critical analysis of the South experience with specific reference to the Commonwealth Games in Delhi in 2010 (CWG, 2010) , the FIFA 2010 World Cup in South Africa and the FIFA 2014 World Cup in Brazil. This paper introduces a comparative dimension to the analysis of mega-events in Southern cities, while being sensitive to the differences between the three countries.
A key argument of this paper is that in all three countries the main goal is to promote the status and power of the postcolonial nation-state. While there were some benefits, especially in terms of infrastructure development, the Indian, Brazilian and South African experience suggests that benefits accrued to the elite at the expense of the poor, and socio-economic inequalities were exacerbated. In all three cases the poor were further marginalised by evictions, loss of livelihoods and violations of human rights. Data for this paper were collected during field visits to India and Brazil before and after the events, and because of time, cost and language constraints, the focus was on documentary sources. This included bid documents, official government records and investigative reports, consultancy reports, information from the international sport bodies, media reports and data collected by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), especially focusing on social challenges. Official documents pertaining to the bids were not readily available. Some of these documents were accessed through networks developed in each country, and other relevant materials were available online -the 2010 FIFA bid documents, for example, were not publically accessible. The Mail and Guardian newspaper used the Promotion of Access to Information Act to obtain this document. The reason for the secrecy was apparent as the South African bid was described as a 'curious me´lange of hyperbole and underestimation' (Tolsi, 2010: 1) . Most of the 2014 FIFA documents were written in Portuguese -however, some of the NGOs provided English translations.
Throughout this paper the thematic analysis of information from the different countries focuses on: budget overruns, global reputation, forced evictions and human rights violations, loss of livelihoods and sustainable legacies, and the nature of protest and resistance. Documents used were reliable and credible, and included similar/ overlapping information from several organisations including the NGO sector (e.g. Bharucha, 2006; EQUATIONS, 2010; Housing and Land Rights Network, 2011; Mishra et al., 2010; Sharma, 2009) . It must be noted that two broad divisions and trends were evident. Firstly, motivation for the bid processes and the perceived benefits from the mega-events emerged from government sources and consultancy companies (e.g. Deloitte, 2010; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011; South Africa, 2010; Union Government, 2011) . Secondly, concerns regarding negative social/economic impacts were associated with the NGO, community and civil society sectors (e.g. Durban Social Forum, 2010; Housing and Land Rights Network, 2011 ; National Coalition of Local Committees for a People's World Cup and Olympic, 2012). The latter also monitored the nature of protest and resistance associated with the different mega-events, especially in Brazil and South Africa with national and global media reports helping inform gaps in the analytical narrative. A brief overview of mega-events in developing countries is where this paper now turns.
Mega-events in developing countries
Mega-events attract large numbers of spectators and billions of viewers through satellite television transmission (see Andranovich et al., 2002; Matheson and Baade, 2004; Matheson, 2006) . The exposure brought upon by sporting mega-events such as the Olympic Games or the FIFA World Cup is to further open a country to subsequent economic investments and to generate increased tourism revenue following the event. Furthermore, with the influx of capital that is expected into the country, together with the infrastructural investment that is required for the event, the development of targeted urban zones is fast tracked (Bass and Pillay, 2008) . There is a view that developing countries are likely to benefit more from mega-events, as Zimbalist (2010: 11) notes, events 'can serve as a catalyst for the construction of modern transportation, communications, and sports infrastructure', thereby bringing updated and modern amenities. However, developing countries usually have many urgent social priorities such as the provision of basic services for the poor, including water, sanitation, housing and education. Hence, infrastructure projects should be adapted to the priorities of the country, rather than the narrow demands of the mega-event in question. Finally, the cost of developing, and maintaining, infrastructure is extremely high, especially since most infrastructures have to be developed from scratch (Matheson and Baade, 2004) .
Other concerns are infrastructures developed for the event itself would be of little or no use to the host city or country after the event, resulting in costly white elephants (Tilley, 2006) . For example, Nigeria, who hosted the 2003 All Africa Games and spent $426 m to construct a 60,000 capacity stadium -which today remains empty. Such expenditures are viewed as inappropriate misallocations of public funding in countries facing compelling social and economic challenges (Barclay, 2009) . A key difference between developed and developing countries is that the former usually have excellent infrastructure facilities and are thus well equipped to host mega-events, with minimum expenditure (Ling, 2005) . Hence, developing countries hosting mega-events spend far more than their northern counterparts (see Table 1 ). The high level of spending associated with preparations for a mega-event weighs heavily on the economy of a developing country (Matheson, 2006) . In India, Brazil and South Africa costs were underestimated and the economic and social benefits were exaggerated.
Country information
India, Brazil and South Africa have several common characteristics, including colonial histories, social stratification (segregation/ prejudices, in terms of race in South Africa and Brazil, and caste in India) and elite/dominant economic powers in their (Laurmann, 2014; Payne, 2005) . These associations enforce and monitor certain compulsory demands to which host nations and cities have to conform. It must be noted that these demands have been largely configured based on developed world perspectives (see Ackermann, 2011) . Criteria include number and type of stadiums, media and communication facilities to reach global television audiences, upgraded transport infrastructure (in/around host cities), increased accommodation (hotels) to accommodate participants and the expected influx of tourists. Also, national laws are suspended to favour the international organisation for the duration of the event. Furthermore, the bidding country commits to absorbing any cost overruns, a guarantee which is 'akin to writing a blank cheque for a purchase, with the certainty that the cost will be more than what has been quoted' (Flyvbjerg and Stewart, 2012: 11) .
Delhi's intension of bidding for the 2010 CWGs was to promote growth and development, upgrade infrastructure, stimulate tourism and market the city as a global city destination, all to project India as an emerging economy. Moreover, one source highlights:
The games will be the catalyst for the development of the city of Delhi and its environs. New venues will be built, existing world-class venues will be further upgraded and a range of infrastructure projects which will benefit the population of Delhi and its surrounding areas will be initiated and completed. (d2010.thecgf.com, accessed 9 April 2010) In the South Africa bid document, President Thabo Mbeki highlighted the African continental link and offered various assurances to FIFA, noting:
As the national Government, we unequivocally commit ourselves to provide every guarantee requested and every resource necessary . . . We want, on behalf of our continent to stage an event that will send ripples of confidence from Cape to Cairo -an event that will create social and economic opportunities throughout Africa . . . our mission is to demonstrate our modern stadiums, world-class infrastructure, advanced technology, mature business systems and proven organizational capacity. (South Africa, 2010: 3) In terms of its continental rotation policy FIFA had agreed in 2003 that the 2014 World Cup will be held in South America. Brazil was the only bid country, despite initial concerns from FIFA whether the country would meet the high standards and associated costs. Lula da Silva, Brazil's president promised to support the country's bid to host the competition:
After 64 years, Brazil meets all the criteria to organise the World Cup and the country deserves it . . .Football is the greatest passion in the country and it deserves to host the World Cup . . .I will give all the backing necessary . . .[so] that . . . we can hold the World Cup in Brazil. (www. cup2014.info/bidding/Brazil/Brazil.html) President Lula da Silva and his successor Dilma Rousseff, promised a 'cup to end all cups'. After the announcement on 30 October 2007 that Brazil would host the 2014 FIFA World Cup, President Lula da Silva commented that Brazil has: 'conquered international citizenship', 'moved from a second-level to first-class country' and 'finally buried the mutt syndrome' (Coakley and Souza, 2013: 581) . Table 2 presents a summary of a selection of global headlines relating to each country during and immediately after the mega-events, respectively, and which, a cursory glance suggests, is rather unflattering in the quest for global prestige. Professor Rajesh Chakrabarti of the Hyderabad-based Indian School of Business raised a valid issue: 'one must balance the questions of improving the daily livelihood of the common man with the so-called national prestige that only the pampered urban elite care about'. The aspirations to be recognised as a world class city and global metropolis were subsequently interpreted as an attempt to create a 'slum-free' Delhi and to 'render poverty invisible', which did 'not diminish poverty, but created new places and positions for poor people', at considerable disadvantage compared to their original locations (Rao, 2010: 404) .
Similar tendencies were evident in Brazil and South Africa. A key question was whether India (and Brazil/South Africa) was aspiring 'for a false national honour and fleeting international prestige based on an extravagant sporting event that the country can ill afford'-against the reality of glaring socio-economic inequalities (Mishra et al., 2010: 4) . In spite of the initial hype and optimism, the different mega-events favoured the elite and bypassed the poor, and frequently exacerbated their condition with forced removals, displacement, loss of livelihoods, violations of human rights and denial of civil liberties -these themes are discussed in the next section.
The realities
The nature of urban governance associated with mega-events is 'characterised by less democratic and more elite-driven priorities' (Swyngedouw et al., 2002: 542) . In all three countries there was a lack of public transparency and democratic accountability when deciding to bid for the games. If such consultation processes did take place at the initial proposal stage, it was very likely that the majority of the populace would have opposed the decision to make a bid. For example, the Delhi bid was organised secretly and the public were unaware of serious deviations from the master plan of the city (www.peaceinst.org, accessed 11 May 2011). Generally bids for mega-events are promoted by influential, politically connected persons and groups in the private and public spheres, who operate in abstraction from public accountability (Andranovich et al., 2002) . These include global corporations, for example, Pricewater houseCoopers (2011) and Deloitte (2010) , who are actively involved in developing and encouraging governments to bid for these international events. In this regard the views of PricewaterhouseCoopers on megaevents and infrastructure development are instructive:
The transformative effect of well-thoughtout supporting infrastructure for a mega-event like the Olympics or World Cup football has long-lasting economic, demographic, and social implications for the entire region (p. 2) . . . Our experience of advising organising committees, contractors, and host countries allows us to discern -from the perspective of an infrastructure investment -the factors that create a lasting legacy for a host city or country. (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011: 3) .
A similar view was articulated by Deloitte (2010: 3) Major sporting and entertainment events . . . have become a top agenda item for governments around the world . . . It is observed that such organisations serve as million-dollar consultants who 'do not fully represent the population of a host city or nation, nor are they likely to speak-. . . on behalf of those who lack power and resources', for whom benefits are unlikely (Coakley and Souza, 2013: 581) . There was a predictable pattern, jubilation at the announcement of a successful mega-event bid and then dejection as the negative social and economic consequences became evident, and these include: budget and cost overruns, forced evictions and human rights violations, loss of livelihoods and questionable legacies.
Budget and cost overruns
Research conducted by Bent Flyvbjerg suggests that in terms of World Cup and Olympics expenditure 'costs wind up being significantly higher than what was initially estimated . . . while . . . the actual benefits are lower' (cited in Kennis (2014: 4) ). The major consequences of this anomaly 'are years of locked up investments, low returns, and long term debts -all of which have to be eventually paid by the citizens through increased taxes' (Hazards Centre, 2010: 22) . The original estimate for the Delhi 2010 CWG was $270 m, and the final cost escalated to $4.1bn (Mishra et al., 2010) . Furthermore, between 2006 and 2010 about $140 million from the Scheduled Caste Sub-Plan budget intended for the welfare of Dalits was irregularly diverted for use in the preparations for the CWG in Delhi (Ramachandran and Goel, 2011) . In Brazil, World Cup expenditure escalated to $15 billion, and government funds allocated for public facilities such as schools and hospitals were diverted to the FIFA project (Kennis, 2014) . Also, the government 'spent an additional $900 million on police technology, including surveillance drones, to ensure that anyone upset about all this didn't cause too much of a ruckus' (Kennis, 2014: 4) . In South Africa the initial estimated cost for the FIFA 2010 project was $519 m, which would come from the public purse. By 2010 this had escalated to $8.9bn -1709% surge from the original estimate (Bond and Cottle, 2011) .
There was also large-scale corruption in the planning and organisation of the Delhi CWG 2010, especially with regard to bidding for tenders and contracts and senior officials were implicated (Union Government, 2011). Pressure to meet FIFA imposed deadlines resulted in stadia and infrastructure contracts being awarded to large established companies, with evidence of collusion and corruption between firms in an attempt to inflate costs and increase profits in Brazil (Kiernan, 2014) and South Africa (Bowen et al., 2012) . There was also a serious skills shortage (ranging from welders to engineers) which required recruiting from international labour markets (Mokopanele, 2006; Shenton, 2014) .
Forced evictions and human rights violations
Mega-events are usually associated with forced removals, evictions and displacements -'the real legacy of major sporting events' (Porter, 2009: 395) . In aspiring for global, world class status, poverty was an embarrassment. Hence, there was a purging of slums and street traders, and other visible signs of poverty in host cities. According to a study by the Housing and Land Rights Network -an arm of the Habitat International Coalition, between 2004 and 2010, about 200,000 slum dwellers were evicted from Delhi in preparation for the CWG (Mishra et al., 2010) . About 35,000 families were removed from public property for the 2010 CWG in Delhi (Amis, 2013) . The razing of the Yamuna Pushta informal settlement in Delhi which resulted in the displacement of 40,000 families (140,000) was linked to the CWG (Bharucha, 2006) . According to Mishra et al. (2010: 3) the victims are the: urban poor, especially women, children, persons with disabilities, dalits, older persons, and other marginalized groups . . . 'Beggars' and homeless citizens are being rounded up, arrested and arbitrarily detained . . . Civil liberties in Delhi are being curtailed, and . . . the city is likely to witness increased surveillance and restrictions in the guise of security measures. (see Table 3) About 50 workers were killed in accidents in CWG construction sites in Delhi, and there were more fatalities in related projects such as the Delhi Metro. This was attributed to the pressure to meet deadlines, resulting in a neglect of worker safety considerations (Amis, 2013) . Exploitation of workers in preparation for the 2010 CWG was common, involving 'low pay, unsafe working conditions, lack of housing, use of child labour, non-registration of workers, and denial of social security benefits' (Mishra et al., 2010: 3) .
In South Africa about 20,000 residents were displaced from the Joe Slovo informal settlement in Cape Town and moved to the impoverished outskirts of the city in preparation for the FIFA 2010 World Cup (Newton, 2009 ). The KwaZulu-Natal Elimination and Prevention of Reemergence of Slums Act (2006) was promulgated to eliminate 'shacks' in and around the city, and the intention was to extend this law to other provinces. However, this law was declared to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of South Africa on 14 October 2009 (Selmeczi, 2011). In Brazil, Witness, the civil rights group estimated that 170,000 people could be evicted in preparation for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics (Amis, 2013: 11) . There were concerns 'about the lack of transparency and consultation with affected communities, limited compensation levels and risks to homelessness' in Sa˜o Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte (Amis, 2013: 30) . Furthermore, Durgante (n.d.: 124) has drawn attention to the following forced removals: 'over 3500 families in Curitiba, Para´(airport and train infrastructure), 15,000 families in Belo Horizonte, Minais Gerais (urban and environmental improvement), 1400 families in Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul (airport runway duplication)'.
Workers' rights were ignored in Brazil and there were high levels exploitation of labour, and there were strikes at eight of the stadium sites, resulting in a loss of 92 working days (Table 4) . Moreover, workers demanded better benefits and working Slum demolitions without rehabilitation Destruction of a temporary night shelter for the homeless Evictions of homeless residents, several of who are construction workers for the Commonwealth Games Arbitrary arrests and detention of 'beggars' and homeless people Destruction of livelihoods of hawkers, vendors and others who work on the streets Inconvenience to the public and accidents because of digging up of streets and redoing pavements Plan to 'hide' slums behind bamboo screens so as to save visitors and athletes the 'not-so-pretty' sight Source: Mishra et al. (2010: 13) .
conditions such as higher remuneration, medical insurance, transport subsidies, increased rates for overtime and a reduction in working hours (Atkins, 2013) . Similar actions and demands emerged in South Africa during the preparations to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup where 112 days were lost through strike action. Workers were able to negotiate for better working conditions, transport subsidies and bonuses, in addition to forming an alliance with StreeNet International -an NGO opposed to forced removals and displacement of informal traders (Table 5) .
The main reason for the violation of human rights in host cities across the three countries was because national sovereignty was ceded to international agencies such as FIFA. This is best presented in Table 6 , in the case of Brazil, where consumer rights, the right to work, the protection of cultural heritage, media freedom and the right to information were all violated in order to favour FIFA and its sponsors. Beyond Table 5 . FIFA 2010 industrial action in South Africa and Workers' victories.
One hundred and twelve days lost through strike action, 22,000 workers were employed in stadium construction. Two surprise wild cat actions at the Green Point Stadium in Cape Town in August 2007 -workers received free transport from the railway station to the construction site. Eleven-day strike -November 2007 -included 1200 workers at the Moses Mabhida Stadium in Durban, workers received an additional bonus payment of R6000 each. Trade union Cosatu: 'construction workers, are as passionate about the 2010 World Cup as anyone, and will do everything possible to ensure its success. But we will not tolerate the stadiums being built by workers who are underpaid or working in dangerous or unhealthy conditions'. Unions managed to ensure that the subcontractors complied with the statutory minimum wages across the 2010 stadiums. The level of unionisation on 2010 stadium construction sites -increased substantially since the beginning of the campaign in 2007. In one and a half years, South African construction trade unions recruited over 12,000 new members out of a total workforce of 22,000. Start a process of networking with StreetNet International, an NGO working on issues of forced removals, informal trader rights and inner city housing conditions. Source: Adapted from Cottle (2010a: 19-28 that, in terms of Article 16 of the FIFA bylaw document bars were prohibited from transmitting World Cup matches without approval or promoting products not endorsed by FIFA (Atkins, 2013) .
Loss of livelihoods
According to a notice in the South African Government Gazette (25 May 2006: 3), the World Cup would be a 'protected event . . . on the understanding that [it] is in the public interest and that the Local Organising Committee (LOC) has created opportunities for South African businesses, in particular those from the previously disadvantaged centres'. Hence, there was some expectation that it will also provide opportunities in the informal and microenterprise sector: 'the seller of boerewors rolls, the taxi driver, the township tour operator, the slick musician who drums up a catchy World Cup melody, the lucky artist who designs the cuddly mascot' (Alfred, (Hedman, 2010) . More than 800 traders were displaced from the site of the new Green Point stadium in Cape Town (Cottle, 2010b) . A similar trend emerged in Brazil where the activities of informal traders and street vendors were severely curtailed. According to FIFA regulations, informal traders are disallowed to operate in a radius of 2 km around World Cup stadiums in Brazil. This adversely affected about 300,000 informal traders in host cities -vendors' permits were not renewed or were withdrawn. Also, there was an increase in police repression: 'vendors' goods have been confiscated without compensation, and their stalls destroyed, they were fined, and there have been cases of physical violence' (Engeli, n.d.: 5) . According to the National Association of Street Vendors of India over 300,000 street vendors lost their livelihoods as a result of the 2010 CWGs. Many street vendors were arbitrarily evicted before the games in the quest to promote Delhi as a world class city (EQUATIONS, 2010) . Given the scale of removals in Delhi: forced evictions result [ed] in both temporary loss of wages as well as a permanent decrease in income for the displaced . . . At several sites, people reported that they were 'just managing to survive' after the demolition their homes and destruction of their livelihoods. (Housing and Land Rights Network, 2011: 36) The Commonwealth Games 2010-Campaign for Justice Movement (cited in Rice (2010: 1) ) appealed to the CWG 2010 organisers to:
. ensure all workers preparing for Games are paid wages according to the law and that health and safety legislation and child labour laws are enforced; . stop removal of street vendors, ragpickers and bicycle rickshaw pullers and ensure informal workers are able to pursue their livelihoods; . ensure all small workplaces and factories can remain open during the Games or receive compensation for loss of livelihood.
Hence, contrary to the exaggerated claims in bid books about creating employment, especially about increasing livelihood opportunities for the poor, the mega-events had the opposite effect -particularly in the informal economy.
Questionable legacies
Although there are many types of infrastructural developments that take place in preparation for hosting a mega-event, a key issue is what happens after the event, especially in developing countries. In South Africa a major concern was the future use of the 10 stadiums after the 2010 World Cup, that they could become costly white elephants, adding further financial burden on municipalities. The majority of host cities could afford to pay for the maintenance of their stadiums, and these costs would have to be covered by taxpayer money (Eybers, 2010: 8) . The cost of maintaining the Moses Mabhida stadium in Durban, for example, was estimated to be R28m annually (Seale, 2010) . Trevor Phillips, the former director of the South African Premier Soccer League, posed a critical question and comment:
What the hell are we going to do with a 70,000-seater football stadium in Durban once the World Cup is over? Durban has two football teams which attract crowds of only a few thousand. It would have been more sensible to have built smaller stadiums nearer the football-loving heartlands and used the surplus funds to have constructed training facilities in the townships. (cited in Minto, 2010: 1) Brazil decided to have 12 host cities, although eight was acceptable to FIFA. Seven new stadiums were built and five renovated, and now following the event Brasilia, Cuiaba´, Natal and Manaus struggle to fill stadiums. These noted cities do not have football teams that fall into the top divisions in Brazil, and hence these new stadiums would not be sustainable. The cost of the four stadiums was about $2bn (Macur, 2014 ). An interesting proposal was that FIFA and the IOC should encourage host cities to build temporary stadiums or upgrade existing ones, rather than build new structures (Macur, 2014) .
Twelve new stadiums were constructed for CWG 2010, but only three were sustainable. Most of the stadiums were underutilised after CWG 2010 and were not able to attract spectators or sponsors. This was because there was no public participation and no long-term vision at the initial planning phase (Sharma, 2009 ). Bhatia (2011 described the legacy of the CWG 2010 as: a glittering mass of structural steel, cement and aluminum, that have already begun to gather the rust of inactivity . . . Had these stadiums been created with the intent of a future with community or public school programmes, or had they been designed with new innovative architectural ideals, their worth in the long term would be guaranteed.
No consideration was given to the future use and sustainability of the stadiums. As hosting costs escalated alongside widening socio-economic inequalities the marginalised poor began to mobilise and protest against the mega-events.
Protest and resistance
As a result of the secrecy and lack of transparency there is usually little or no opposition to countries and cities making bids for mega-events. Frequently successful bids have been patriotically and popularly endorsed. It is only when the social and economic ills become apparent that some form of protest action emerges, and in the cases of India, Brazil and South Africa it was a case of too little, too late.
The 'Anti-Commonwealth Games Front' organised a public meeting to protest against the Commonwealth Games at Jantar Mantar, Delhi, on 30 September 2010. The organisations comprised civil society structures and social movements and included the following parties: National Alliance of Peoples' Movements, Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights, University Community for Democracy, Centre for Advocacy and Research, Socialist Party, Socialist Front and Socialist Janata Party. They demanded:
full accountability from all agencies and departments involved in the CWG, full public disclosure of funds, transparency of transactions, protection of human rights of Delhi's citizens, compensation for livelihoods lost, adequate rehabilitation of the displaced close to their places of work, a post-Games legacy plan and cost recovery plan, and prosecution of officials responsible for embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds. (Press Release, 2010: 1) In Delhi it was the very serious charges of corruption associated with senior bureaucrats and politicians that unleashed public rage immediately after the completion of the CWG 2010, and the Indian government was forced to establish a committee to investigate the serious corruption allegations, chaired by the former Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Mr V.K. Shunglu. The audit report identified widespread corruption amongst the organisers of CWG 2010, senior government bureaucrats and politicians. The report was also critical of the CWG 2010 governance model adopted in 2003, as stated:
in which authority was dissipated, accountability was defused and unity of command was not provided or followed . . . inexplicable delays in decision-making . . . put pressure on timelines and . . . led to the creation of an artificial or consciously created sense of urgency . . . appropriate due diligence was conspicuously absent at all levels. (Union Government, 2011: 35) Criticisms about the negative impacts of the 2010 World Cup on the poor in South Africa emerged from the NGO and civil society sectors. For example, the Durban Social Forum (2010: 1), a coalition of more than 20 civic, NGOs and community organisations, asserted that: the ANC have not given a World Cup for All but again chose to deliver to the rich instead of the poor . . . Vulnerable children, traders, the poor, homeless, shack dwellers, refugees . . . are forcible removed so tourists won't see them ... Our government has sold its citizens out for a gigantic, short term publicity stunt and we must not let them forget their responsibilities.
As FIFA 2014 related projects increasingly displaced the poor in the different host cities, Brazilians became increasingly disenchanted. Protests escalated in June 2013 to coincide with the FIFA Confederations Cup. The catalyst for the protest was an increase in public transport fares, but it soon escalated into concerns about corruption, poverty, inadequate public services and crime. However, FIFA 2014 expenditure was the 'lighting conductor'. On 20 June 2013 about a million people across 80 cities joined the protest marches, and there were violent clashes with the police who used rubber bullets and tear gas (Watts, 2013a) . There were demands for FIFA standards in education and health care, and the following statements from protestors captured the essence of public concerns:
The World Cup steals money from health care, education and the poor. The homeless people are being forced from the streets. This is not for Brazil, it's for tourists. (Watts, 2013b: 2) The population of Brazil seems distant from the World Cup because of what people see as corruption and the over spend on the stadiums and the lack of transparency . . . I want a Brazil that is fair and safe and more honest. (Watts, 2013a: 4) The protests continued for the next year until the completion of the FIFA 2014 tournament -sustained by social media networks. Hundreds of protestors were arrested. The Brazilian government threatened to equate protest to a form of 'terrorism'. In Rio de Janeiro, Pacification Peace Units (UPP), a form of community policing, were introduced in favelas close to FIFA 2014 events in order to maintain law and order. However, in some UPPs, police were accused of abusing their powers, and crime was displaced to favelas where there were no pacification units (Fischer, 2014) .
Conclusion
Although events such as the FIFA world cup and the CWG do produce some benefits especially in terms of some infrastructure development, the Indian, Brazilian and South African experiences suggest that the privileged tend to benefit at the expense of the poor, and that socio-economic inequalities tend to be exacerbated. It was also evident that the different mega-projects in India, Brazil and South Africa only paid rhetorical lip service to reducing the socio-economic inequalities and addressing the needs of the poor. Such projects were largely driven by elite interests and underwritten with public funds -with limited or no public participation. Moreover, Green (2003: 163) has labelled such megaevent experiences in urban centres in the South as 'staged cities' in order to illustrate the contradictions 'between the mega-event as a means of constructing an image of ''development'' and the actively concealed landscape of the urban poor'. Therefore, mega-events were specifically used to promote the emerging status/power of the three countries, while simultaneously serving as a catalyst to push the urban poor to the periphery, or out of cities all together. There was simply no place for the poor in aspiring world class cities and emerging global powers.
There were legitimate concerns that the escalation in the costs of the stadiums and infrastructure in India, Brazil and South Africa resulted in the diversion of funds from more urgent social priorities such as housing, healthcare and education. In all three countries a key goal was to promote the status and power of the post-colonial nation-state (although ironically ceding sovereignty to entities like FIFA for the duration of events). The questionable legitimacy and legal status of mega-sport events are compounded when there is a suspension of legal norms and political contestation to create a city or ''state of exception''. This permits governments and their partners to ride roughshod over the rights of citizens in pursuit of their immediate and long term aims for the events and for the city. (Richmond, 2013: 3) Protest and resistance against the violation of the rights of the poor in terms of evictions and loss of livelihoods were largely muted in India and South Africa, and escalated in Brazil a year before the 2014 FIFA World Cup. This was primarily because these projects were presented as being part of national state agendas, and any opposition or criticism was viewed as being unpatriotic. Notwithstanding the pro-poor rhetoric and expectations of developmental outcomes in India, Brazil and South Africa, the ultimate impact was anti-poor. The question of who benefits and the diversion of scarce resources needs to be critically interrogated when hosting a megaevent, especially in a developing country context.
Comparative studies, such as presented here are crucial to understanding the impulse for hosting mega-events and the associated short-and long-term impacts on the host countries and cities. In India, Brazil and South Africa there has been a shift from public interest planning towards reconfiguring the built environment to favour global sporting mega-events. While this paper has looked at the FIFA World Cup and CWGs, it will be important to broaden the scope of this research in the future to include the Olympic Games which as opposed to the FIFA World Cup is hosted by a single city. While countries in the global North like Canada are turning their backs on hosting sporting events (with Edmonton rejecting the CWG), and seeing the need to spend rather on education and health, it becomes even more imperative to investigate the impact of these spectacles on the economy of developing countries like South Africa where indices indicate that inequality is deepening rather than being mitigated.
